



The Transformation of Japan’s Environmental Policy: 












Department of Social Sciences 
Curtin University of Technology 
GPO Box U1987 






In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was the leading market known for being 
an innovator of environmental policy. Other OECD countries found 
much to emulate from Japan’s policies. Two decades later, Japan 
appears to have lost its innovative edge to other OECD countries. Why 
has Japan fallen from its position as the global leader? How should 
Japan regain its reputation? To answer these questions, I will examine 
possible causes of the rise and fall of Japanese environmental policy by 
exploring its domestic policy subsystem, the international arena, and the 
arena where domestic and foreign issues converge or the emerging space, 
in particular, where sub-national authorities have become increasingly 
recognised as a direct contributor to global environmental strategies.  
Each of three approaches - the domestic/foreign divide, interaction, and 
convergence - represents a partial explanation to these questions. This 












What accounts for environmental policy change over time? There is a different level 
of interests at work on the multilateral level for environmental protection. This article 
will examine how environmental policy making in Japan has developed over periods 
of time as Japan has gone through different phases of environmental protection from 
addressing domestic to global issues. To this end, it will analyse the dynamic 
relationships that exist in Japan among actors, interests, institutions and political 
coalitions and identify the determinants of changes in these relationships. It will 
illustrate that compelling analyses of the empirical puzzle can be conducted through 
combining the traditionally separated levels, the increasingly interactive levels, and 
the emerging convergence, of domestic and foreign politics to gain analytical leverage 
over multilayered and complex connections over the internationalisation of 
environmental issues. 
 
In the 1960s, advanced economies in major countries, such as the United States, West 
Germany and Japan, ushered in the era of national environmental policy-making. By 
the early 1970s, Japan had one of the world’s strongest environmental regulations. 
Yet Japan had also been known for its strong commitment to economic development 
and business interests. Why was Japan able to get environmental issues on the agenda 
and take legislative action only for a short period of time? Many scholars argue that 
the severity of industrial pollution made it impossible to ignore and thus prevailed 
over pro-development policies in electoral processes (Krauss and Simcock 1980, 
McKean 1980 and 1981, Reed 1981). Some focus on actors, for example, 
emphasising Japan’s anti-industrial pollution movements as an ultimate factor 
(McKean 1981, Reich 1984). The policy shift was ascribed to political pressures that 
these movements generated as both the electoral threat to the ruling party and the 
productivity threat to big business grew rapidly (Broadbent 1998 and 2005, pp. 114-9). 
Opposition-controlled localities are also considered to be a continued source of 
pressure on the national government (Muramatsu 1975, Krauss and Simcock 1980, 
MacDougall 1980, Steiner 1980, Reed 1981, Foljanty-Jost 1995). Opposition parties 
in control of local governments were quick to adopt stricter pollution prevention 
measures than those imposed at the national level. But their labour constituency was 
reluctant to endorse the high pollution related expenses (McKean 1981, p. 183) and 
once the national ruling party incorporated some of the opposition’s more popular 
measures into its platform, the momentum from local activism waned in the mid-
1970s. Equally important, others are intrigued by the puzzle of why in the 1980s 
Japan began to leg behind major European countries, such as Germany, in 
environmental initiative and innovations. Foljanty-Jost (2000) has brought attention to 
the circumstances under which environmental policy was to be initiated and argued 
that the policy environment had fundamentally changed due to the improved air 
quality. Broadbent (1998) points out the failure of Japanese environmental 
movements to establish powerful national interest groups. Japan had subsequently a 
very small and weakly organised community of environmental groups (Schreurs 
2002). The disintegration of anti-industrial pollution movements was seen as a 
reflection of shifts in public opinion (Vogel 1990). These studies view policy 
formation as an essentially domestic-level process taking place within states. The 
objective of this article, however, is to examine how the dynamics of environmental 
policy making has changed as environmental issues become internationalised over 
time. [1] 
 
Traditional approaches to an explanation of this emerging phenomenon simply 
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highlight the mutual interplay between separated levels of politics. Domestic factors 
are considered to be a determinant of foreign policy (“second image”) (Waltz 1959) or 
the external environment is claimed to affect domestic politics (“second image 
reversed”) (Katzenstein 1976, Gourevitch 1978, Rogowski 1989).  A more recent 
approach, the “two-level-games” theory, does suggest a shift from strictly delineated 
domestic-foreign dichotomies to an interactive levels approach while viewing 
international negotiations as influenced simultaneously by both domestic and 
international constraints (Putnam 1988, Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993). This 
approach is subject to criticism on the grounds that it places the sub-national level of 
participation to the second level of the game or that it views that participation not as 
the direct sources of international bargaining, but as a mere constraint on the bargains. 
Equally important, it is inadequate to consider the effect of international norm 
diffusion on sub-national agents and specific domestic settings (Risse-Kappen 1995, 
Checkel 1997). Local and provincial actors have increasingly considered themselves 
direct players in a global game to cope with the local impact of climate change (e.g., 
Mlinar 1995; Litfin 2000). The dynamics of the sub-national level of participation 
would seem to reveal convergence, rather than a simple interplay of domestic and 
international politics. This can be seen as a rapidly expanding sphere of action in 
which the boundaries of domestic and foreign affairs are eroding (Rosenau 1997). The 
boundary-eroding dynamics have become highly salient in the field of international 
environmental cooperation precisely because the causes of environmental risk are 
locally specific in character yet local action can simultaneously be part of global 
strategies. The necessity of integrating local actions to ensure the optimal reduction of 
environmental risks has been provided for in the multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs). [2] 
 
The first analytical framework – divide - views environmental policy-making as a 
fundamentally domestic-level process occurring within the internal arena. Actors in 
the process of political coalition building treat the reduction of environmental risk as a 
local or national public good whose benefits accrue to the public of a nation and 
correspond to national boundaries. The question of who bears the cost of providing 
the public good at the local or national level lies at the heart of environmental politics.  
The second analytical framework – interaction - refers to environmental policy-
making based on the simultaneous interplay between domestic interests and 
international bargaining while presuming the different levels of domestic/foreign 
affairs. Environmental degradation may well spread beyond national borders and 
could have a regional/global range. Public intervention is thus required to provide 
both local/national and regional/international public goods for environmental risk-
reduction. Policy-makers deal with two sets of constraints: domestic constraints on 
cost-sharing for environmental risk-reduction and foreign pressures on collective 
action over resources to contribute regional/international environmental benefits. 
Environmental politics is a locus where policy-making must choose how to reconcile 
international and domestic concerns. The third analytical framework – convergence - 
is defined as a penetration phenomenon where environmental policy-making at one 
level of politics serves as decision-making in the political process of another. The 
reduction of industrial pollution by a municipal authority will improve air quality in 
the locality, and at the same time the locally specific action may directly contribute to 
global governance for greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Environmental politics 
tends to evolve around coordinating the provision of the intermeshed public goods. 
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The following section explores the expansion of environmental regulations over 
industrial pollution and voluntary agreements between business and government in 
the 1970s and the use of pro-business, market-oriented approaches to environmental 
protection in the 1980s. These two decades saw policy formation as an essentially 
domestic-level process. The second section presents the case study of Japan’s 
international bargaining over climate change in the 1990s. Environmental policy 
formation in the 1990s was quite compatible with much in the interactive two-level-
games of constraints and opportunities on both the domestic and international levels. 
The third section gives a relatively unexplored view of sub-national participation in 
international environmental regimes. It illustrates the emerging phenomenon of 
convergence from the perspective of the cross-border and cross-level harmonization 
of politics and policy. The final section analyses the transformation of these 
environmental affairs in terms of an eclectic interpretation of environmental politics 
operating along the domestic/foreign divide, interaction, and convergence forces. 
 
National environmental policy in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
These two decades saw the era of national environmental policy-making. The most 
fundamental explanation of policy expansion is as a response to new or increased 
demand. Environmental policy growth and innovations are directly related to the 
situational circumstances that would create or increase the demand of policy making. 
In this regard, the case of Japan would suggest two key events: the industrial pollution 
crisis in the late 1960s and the two oil crises in the 1970s (e.g., McKean 1981, 
Broadbent 1998). In the late 1960s, the polluted air, soil and water began to cause 
human hazards in a visible way. In Japan, local authorities, the layer of government 
closest to the people, were quick to respond to local populace demands (Krauss and 
Simcock 1980, pp. 221-2). During this period, disgruntled voters elected a wave of 
candidates from the opposition coalitions as local chief executive positions in the 
highly urbanised areas where the quality of life was deteriorating. The electoral 
success brought about a political crisis to the party in power, Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) (Muramatsu 1975, Steiner 1980, Broadbent 1998). In 1970 the National 
Diet of Japan, the so-called “Environmental Pollution Diet,” passed radical 
improvements to the 1967 comprehensive government countermeasures against a 
wide range of environmental pollution, pledging the steepest reduction of 
environmental pollutants in the world. [3] The conservative coalition of the 
bureaucracy, LDP and business, responded to environmentalists’ demand with its 
emphasis on the use of strict regulations rather than market-based solutions. 
 
Following the passage of the new environmental laws at the Environmental Pollution 
Diet, the most important factor was the external environment in which the 1973 oil 
crisis claimed to trigger a greater concern nationwide about Japan’s need to promote 
more energy efficiency. Japanese leaders viewed the nation as the potential victims of 
uncontrollable external forces as Japan relied on imports to meet a full 85 percent of 
its energy needs. [4] In 1978 the Japanese government created a tax incentive system 
for investment of energy conservation facilities and just after the second oil crisis in 
1979, it began to apply the Energy Conservation Law to energy conservation 
measures. [5] In the 1980s, the Japanese government played a regulatory role in two 
fundamental ways: financial incentives to boost energy-saving initiatives and 
investment, and energy efficiency standardisation for manufacturing facilities, 
transportation machines, buildings, houses and consumer products. On average in the 
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1980s, Japan spent 1.0 energy unit per GDP, while the OECD average spent 1.5, 
Britain 1.3, West Germany 1.5, the United States 1.9, and China 3.8 energy unit. [6] 
Japanese government’s regulations to improve the energy efficiency of production 
were not part of environmental policy, but rather conceived of as industrial policy for 
managing Japan’s energy demand/supply structure. Nonetheless, Japan’s efforts to 
maximise energy efficiency consequently contributed to emission reduction efforts.  
The 1980s was distinctive in that “Most of Japan’s new environmental improvements 
during this period came as a by-product of energy conservation measures” (Broadbent 
2005, p.119). 
 
In Japan, by the mid-1970s, the focus of environmental protection shifted from 
identifiable sources of industrial pollution to diffuse, no-point sources of non-
industrial pollution. Environmental citizens’ movements were unable to display the 
same level of community solidarity that was a key characteristic of the earlier 
movements. Most environmental groups remained small and poorly funded at the 
grassroots level and failed to have a direct voice in the national policy-making process. 
In the late 1970s, when the public responsiveness to environmental pollution 
problems significantly declined, progressive local chief executives in major 
metropolitan areas departed from the political arena. [7] Public opinion surveys also 
reflected this trend by indicating a significant drop from over 20 percent in 1973 to 9 
percent in 1981 in the percentage of the public that felt adversely affected by air 
pollution (JEA 1982, chp 2-1-3). [8] The conservative coalition-building thus 
prevailed in the absence of the attentive public and highly mobilised societal actors. In 
the early 1980s, salience of environmental regulations decreased rather abruptly due 
to changes in the situational circumstances. Faced with the urgent necessity of fiscal 
reconstruction, the Japanese government followed the “zero-ceiling” policy from 
1983 to 1987, which amounted to a freeze on government spending. This was 
accompanied by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s initiatives toward neoliberal 
economic strategies, namely, market-driven, voluntary solutions to environmental 
problems. In the 1980s, there was lack of socially mobilised forces that were able to 
put on the political agenda environmental issues unattended by government or 
corporations.   
 
Coalition building for national environmental policy in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
In post-World War II, Japan’s state-led corporatist policy networks with big business 
were to provide public opinion with less opportunity to affect policy outcomes. The 
passage of the 1967 Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control was a result of 
the coalition building in which a Ministry of Health and Welfare draft (recommending 
strict industrial liability) had been emasculated by the economic ministries and the 
business peak organisations for giving priority to development over the environment 
(McKean 1981, p. 19, Broadbent 1998, p. 118). However, by 1970 a high degree of 
societal mobilisation against industrial pollution created a new support basis for 
environmental policies and led to LDP’s devastating losses at local elections. LDP 
politics subsequently entailed a crisis effort to advance environmental policies into an 
electorally attractive proposition. Its leadership rushed to radically revise the Basic 
Law at the Environmental Pollution Diet, without first coordinating with business 
peak organisations’ interest (Broadbent 1998, pp. 120-1). It is important to point out 
that Japan’s environmental policy community was too fragmented and weak to have a 
concerted, direct voice in the policy-making process. A potential key actor, the sub-
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cabinet level Environmental Agency for coordinating the environmental policy 
community, was established only in 1971 and remained a weak, secondary body to 
larger economic ministries. Over 3,000 citizens’ environmental groups were socially 
mobilised yet had never grown into a nationally coordinated movement or a national 
political party, such as Germany’s Green Party.  In the mid-1970s, the LDP began to 
regain its electoral momentum while incorporating some of the local policy 
innovations into its own platform. By then, the national government had caught up 
with local governments; the national standard was no less stringent than the locally-
imposed innovative measures for air quality (JEA 1979). 
 
In the 1980s, LDP’s vote share rebounded nationally and locally. The electoral 
success brought back the old coalition-building process to Japan’s environmental 
politics. Coordinating with LDP’s business clients, industrial pollution control 
became integrated as part of traditional industrial policy (IDE 2007). The oil crises 
overshadowed a genuine concern for environmental degradation. The Keidanren 
(Japanese association of business organisations) worked with the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), which tended to see technology as the 
solution to environmental problems, in strengthening energy efficiency to free 
Japanese manufacturers of their external energy dependence (IDE 2007). To facilitate 
manufacturers’ initiatives in energy conservation, the Japanese government offered 
support through low-interest loans and tax relief as well as opportunities to learn from 
collaborative government-industry-university research (Ren 2005, pp. 307-10). 
Japan’s pollution-intensive sector output as a percentage of non-pollution-intensive 
sector production dramatically dropped from nearly 70 percent in 1975 to 35 percent 
in 1989 while its import/export ratios of polluting products rapidly increased from as 
low as 20 percent in 1976 to a high of 95 percent in 1990 (Mani and Wheeler 1998, pp. 
224-9). [9] In short, the coalition building process effectively facilitated the 
accompanied net displacement of pollution production to trading partners as well as 
the decline of pollution-intensive industries.  
 
Environmental foreign policy in the 1990s 
 
Without environmental degradation, there would be no need for environmental 
protection. However, Japanese export sector’s need for environmental protection did 
not derive from its anticipated environmental degradation, but rather from changing 
international market conditions to which it needed to adjust quickly. By the time when 
Europe-led business was fully engaged in the process of establishing environmental 
standards leading up the 1992 Earth Summit, the Japanese export sector 
acknowledged that not complying with international environmental management 
standards (ISO14000) would become a disadvantage to Japanese products sold in 
overseas markets. [10] In 1996 the business coalition of the Keidanren and the Japan 
Industrial Standards (JIS) Committee adopted the ISO (International Organization for 
Standardization) international standards as part of JISs, virtually in their original form 
(JEA 1997). 
 
At the government level, by the mid-1980s, Japan was under increasing pressure from 
major OECD countries to play an international role appropriate for its economic 
power. In particular, Japan was strongly criticised for exporting polluting industries to 
Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro pledged to actively participate in 
preserving the global environment. In 1984 the UN General Assembly established the 
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World Commission on Environment and Development (or Brundtland Commission) 
in response to a Japanese proposal. In the wake of the 1987 Brundtland Report, there 
was wide recognition among major OECD countries that global strategies would be 
needed to address inter-related social, environment, and development issues. In 1988 
atmospheric scientists at the Toronto Conference sought to get climate change on the 
international policy agenda calling for a target of a 20 percent reduction in green-
house gases (GHG) below 1988 levels in 15 years. The Japanese government could 
not afford the risk of damaging its international reputation by failing to respond to its 
international commitments and thus established the Cabinet Meeting concerning 
Global Environment Conservation in 1989 for policy coordination among key 
ministries (JEA 1990, chp. 9). In short, foreign pressure hit the Japanese policy 
agenda although there was no serious criticism from within in the absence of a 
strongly mobilised body of Japan’s environmental NGOs. 
 
Costs of provision for environmental foreign policy in the 1990s 
 
Japanese government’s contributions to the issue of climate change fitted well with its 
effort to ease foreign pressure to do more to contribute to international “public goods.” 
In general, regardless of their cost-sharing for CO2 emissions reduction, individual 
countries may receive the benefits of global strategies for climate change anyway. 
There is an aspect of public goods theory in this context (Olson 1965; Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1966). The benefits of climatic risk reduction are non-excludable so that 
any one country has a strong incentive to take a free ride on the efforts of others. Even 
if previously uninvolved in the cost sharing, Japan can be seen to benefit from it. 
From the viewpoint of international reputation, however, if others find Japan’s 
contributions to be less than expected, Japan may suffer from the damage to its 
reputation. This damage may come with other types of material losses, such as carbon 
tariffs Japan has to pay to other countries. The image of a free ride will have a 
negative impact on Japan’s international reputation. Environmental foreign policy 
affects material interests in a way quite different from that of domestic environmental 
policy. Differences in developmental paths among countries have revealed specific 
geographical orientations, that is, North-South focuses. Climate change has been seen 
as a site for dialogue to tackle the North-South divide. Japan has provided technical 
training to people from developing countries to diffuse environment-friendly 
technologies, and official development assistance (ODA) loans in the fields related to 
climate change. In 1992, with an eye to the Rio Summit, the Cabinet adopted the 
ODA-guiding principle of “Environmental conservation and development should be 
pursued in tandem,” which was incorporated into Japan’s first ODA Charter (JMOFA 
2001). At the summit, Japan pledged a substantial increase in its environmental ODA 
– an increment of about US$ 7 – 7.7 billion in a five year period. [11] Other parties in 
the climate negotiations expected Japan’s greater economic capability to incur more 
international responsibility for environmental protection by extending environmental 
aid to developing countries. 
 
Despite its cost-sharing in the form of foreign aid, Japan’s necessary but costly 
policies, like any other county’s concerns, were the ones that were perceived by 
business as likely to affect its profit expectations or lose its market share. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, Japan set the benchmark in energy efficiency that other major OECD 
countries were aspiring to emulate. Yet, in the 1990s, Japan and certain 
environmentally advanced countries switched positions in terms of government and 
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industry initiatives in environmental risk reduction. Climate change/carbon taxes were 
adopted in the early 1990s in Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, and later in 
Britain and Germany while Japan’s business community was largely left to voluntary 
self-regulation for reducing CO2 emissions. Japan has been caught up by European 
countries in the field of industrial energy efficiency and even slipped behind in certain 
industrial sectors (IEA 2007). It is true that, as the Japanese government claims 
(JMETI 2007), Japan’s CO2 emissions per GDP are the lowest level among OECD 
countries. [12] However, Japan’s GDP is overvalued in currency conversions because 
of the high cost of living and thus Japan appears to be much more environment-
efficient than it is. By using purchasing power currency values rather than simple 
currency conversions, Japan’s CO2 emissions per GDP are only equivalent to the EU-
15 average (IEA 2007). Japan is relatively efficient but it is largely because the 
energy-efficient residential and transportation sectors make up for the high level of 
commercial and industrial CO2 emissions per GDP. Japanese housing consumes 
energy far less than those in major OECD countries, although significant growth in 
the proportional share of total CO2 emissions has been continuing for the residential 
sector. Along with the importance of consumer behaviour and lifestyles, the 
commercial and industrial sectors are expected to play a critical role in reducing CO2 
emissions in Japan yet the reductions have been driven by Keidanren-led voluntary 
action. [13] The business community has successfully avoided mandatory 
requirements, such as tax or cap-and-trade schemes at the national level.[14]  
 
Coalition building for environmental foreign policy in the 1990s  
 
International pressure alone did not suffice to account for Japan’s climate change 
diplomacy. Japanese domestic politics became entangled via international 
negotiations. Domestically, the coalition building of climate change differed 
significantly from that of industrial pollution on the dimensions of interests and actors. 
Since the costs and benefits of industrial pollution in the 1970s were relatively 
concentrated on a narrow range of industrial interests and effected residents in 
industrial cities, these groups intensified their political conflict in a direct way. A 
discrete dichotomy of polluters-versus-victims interest representation effectively 
influenced the course of events regarding pollution control and compensation. In 
contrast, a proposed agreement over climate change tends to impose both diffused and 
uncertain adaptation costs on a sectoral basis while offering diffused benefits to a 
wide range of social groups. 
 
Due to the scientific technicality of climate change, Japan’s Environment Agency 
technocrats, who were well informed at international conferences, began to assume a 
major part of the policy debate while drawing on help from scientists in the fields of 
energy, economics and atmospheric science. The Environmental Agency, which had 
been established in 1971 with the aim of coordinating the administration of 
environmental policies, still had to rely in practice on the exclusive exercise of other 
ministries’ jurisdiction over environment-related matters. In this respect, climate 
change was an ideal area where the agency could expand its jurisdiction for policy 
coordination. Yet this environmental coalition was destined to face a tenacious 
resistance by an industrial coalition. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) took on the issue of climate change as a matter of 
industrial policy. The ministry, together with a strong business lobby, opposed a 
carbon tax as well as an emission trading system (Oshitani 2006). Climate change also 
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presented a challenge for energy demand/supply policy to take GHG emissions’ 
constraints into consideration. MITI’s Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, in 
collaboration with coal, electricity, gas, nuclear and petroleum industries, had been 
instrumental in managing Japan’s energy demand/supply structure after experiencing 
the two oil crises (Uchihashi 1995, pp. 163-70). On the other hand, as its negotiations 
took place in the international arena, climate change put the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in a position to be at the very front of coalition building. As Japanese 
diplomats and conservative politicians had been obsessed with international reputation, 
Japan’s leadership in the negotiations was conceived of as its international 
contribution. In 1995 the Japanese government announced its willingness to host 
COP-3 and its reputation was at stake in the success or failure of the conference. The 
objective of the ministry for hosting COP-3 was to adopt a successful multilateral 
protocol and thus enhance its reputation as a leader in the Asia-Pacific. To this end, 
the host nation needed to assure US participation in the protocol and had no choice 
but to persuade other countries to bend to the wishes of the United States (Kameyama 
2004). [15] 
 
In 1990 Japan’s Cabinet adopted an Action Program to Arrest Global Warming, 
which stated “the emission of CO2 should be stabilised on a per capita basis in the 
year 2000 and beyond at about the same level as in 1990” (JMOE 2009). As COP-3 
approached, the apparently unattainable targets remained intact without any careful 
re-examination. Japan was criticised by some countries and environmental groups for 
not accepting legally binding targets at COP-2 yet failed to present its host nation’s 
domestic plan at the opening of COP-3. As negotiations at COP-3 progressed, Japan 
had to submit a proposal for reducing GHG emissions. The environmental coalition, 
led by the Environmental Agency and the National Institute for Environmental 
Studies, argued, by using a model based on the introduction of carbon tax, that a 7.6 
percent CO2 reduction from 1990 levels by 2010 could be achieved (Takeuchi 1998, 
p.156). The industrial coalition argued that Japan had produced the lowest per capita 
CO2 emissions among OECD countries and thus would find it much more difficult 
than others to reduce GHG emissions. As Keidanren announced its voluntary action 
plan in June 1997, the MITI decided to propose reduction targets without imposing 
mandatory requirements on business. The ministry emphasised that reducing CO2 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 would be the best Japan could do to combat climate 
change (Tanabe 1999, pp. 122-23). As the European Union called for a 15 percent 
reduction target at COP-3, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued for an 
internationally acceptable target of 6.5 percent. [16] In September 1997 the Prime 
Minister’s Office, when informed that the United States would finally present its 
proposal, intervened in the bureaucratic impasse, and set Japan’s proposal as a 
reduction of 5 percent reflecting a compromise between bureaucratic interests and 
“internationally acceptable reductions” (Schreurs 2002).     
 
Environmental sub-national-participation in the 1990s and the 2000s 
 
The 1992 Earth Summit recognised the importance of sub-national participation in the 
resolution of global social issues. Agenda 21, which was adopted at the summit, also 
stressed the vital importance of international cooperation on a local level (UNCED 
1992). Article 34 of Japan’s Basic Environment Law, which was enacted in 1993, 
acknowledged the role of local governments as the subjects of international 
environmental cooperation (JMOE 2007). In 1993 the International Council for Local 
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Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) established its Tokyo office with aim to promote 
local initiatives (or Local Agenda 21) in Japan and other Asian countries. [17] Sub-
national participation is desirable for two basic reasons: the need for locally specific 
response to global strategies (as the causes and effects of climate change are local in 
character) and the need for a decentralised form of international environmental 
cooperation (especially as partnerships between local North and South authorities can 
help the developing world to build the capacity of local government) (Shuman 1994; 
Green, Game and Delay 2005). As global strategies for environmental risk reduction 
reach the implementation stage, they demand local action. The linkages between 
international environmental regimes (based on multilateral agreements) and the local 
live-in environment become converged to follow the details of locally specific needs 
for global strategies. The implementation of international agreements links people in 
small-scale social structures to a global environmental regime and then increases the 
visibility of sub-national action in a global game. 
 
In the EU settings, sub-national participation that is mandated in the EU treaties 
allows a direct contact between sub-national authorities and supranational EU 
institutions (e.g., the Committee of the Regions). Increased freedom of sub-national 
participation may also derive from changes in the formal powers of sub-national 
authorities within national boundaries. In 1992 the French government passed national 
legislation allowing its local authorities to sign agreements with overseas counterparts 
(Art 131, Loi d’orientation No. 92-125). Such institutional rules are yet to be seen in 
Japan. The Japanese government has neither clearly regulated nor enabled sub-
national level of participation in international environmental cooperation but in the 
absence of national policy a few front-runner local authorities in Japan are willing and 
capable of contributing to bridging policy gaps between local action and global 
strategies. Without any familiar ground of institutionalized rules or the right to 
legitimately represent itself at the international level, the agency of sub-national actors 
finds a way through political mobilization to move across levels of governments and 




Coalition building for environmental sub-national-participation  
 
To reduce environmental risks at the regional and international levels, Japanese local 
governments have been working with counterpartners, such as overseas local 
authorities, domestic/international NGOs and international organisations. There has 
been an emerging form of environmental activism, transnational coalition building, in 
which local governments are bound together with overseas partners by shared values 
and exchanges of information to work internationally on global environmental 
strategies. According to a Ministry of the Environment’s survey conducted in 2002 
(with 47 prefectures and 40 major cities), 68 percent of the environmental government 
officials “have experience in international environmental cooperation” (JOECC 2003). 
International environmental cooperation at the sub-national level can be categorised 
into four patterns that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: bilateral 
cooperation/partnerships, and sectoral, regional, and international networks/coalitions. 
 
One of the early pioneering efforts was Kitakyushu-Dalian cooperation. The City of 
Kitakyushu was once a polluted “steel town” yet now is renowned for having 
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successfully overcome one of Japan’s worst environmental problems. As the city 
accumulated its environmental management expertise, by the early 1980s a 
neighboring city across the Yellow Sea, Dalian, was about to experience every 
imaginable environmental problem, much like those experienced in Kitakyushu. As 
early as 1981, Kitakyushu began to transfer the know-how of environmental 
management to Dalian. Local knowledge that the Dalian-Kitakyushu partnership had 
provided, persuaded Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the 
importance of locally initiated approaches as an alternative to nationally defined ODA 
projects. The Japanese government thus pledged ODA funds to China for 
implementing a proposed Dalian-Kitakyushu pollution control plan. The national 
government financed the project, but it depended on the Dalian-Kitakyushu 
partnership for successful planning and implementation (COK 1998). This successful 
bilateral cooperation drew much interest among other cities in Asia. 
 
The oldest sectoral network, initiated by a Japanese local government, is the 
International Lake Environment Committee Foundation (ILEC). It was created in 
1986 by Shiga prefecture to support environmentally sound management of lakes and 
their environment, which the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
promotes for developing countries (Kotani 2006). Its activity, such as information 
databases and reporting and monitoring trends, is to enhance environmental 
knowledge in the provision of national and international benefits for reducing 
degradation of lakes (ILEC 2009). Other major sectoral networks followed in the 
1990s: the International EMES [Environmental Management of Enclosed Coastal 
Seas] Center (established by Hyogo prefecture in 1994), the Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) (established in 1998 with the UNEP 
Regional Resource Centre of Asia and the Pacific as the Secretariat and managed by 
Niigata prefecture), and the Kushiro International Wetland Centre (established in 
1995 to implement the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
and operated by the City of Kushiro). 
Regional environmental networks would be defined as where the benefits of 
environmental risk reduction accrue to the public of nations with contiguous borders 
or of neighbouring nations across the sea. In 2000, for example, Kitakyushu City 
established the Kitakyushu Initiative Network, comprising 62 cities from 18 member 
countries of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP) to coordinate the reduction of urban environmental risks (KINS 
2008). Other major regional networks are: the Asian Network of Major Cities 
(ANMC-21) (created in 2001 as a metropolitan multi-issue-oriented network with the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government as the Secretariat), the Environmental Cooperation 
Network of Asian Cities (established in 1997 by the City of Kitakyushu with 7 cities 
in Southeast Asia), and the Northern Forum (proposed by the government of 
Hokkaido in 1974 and set up in 1991 with 15 regional governments from 8 northern 
countries). 
The Regional Network of Local Authorities for the Management of Human 
Settlements (CITYNET) is an international environmental network among local 
authorities with an Asia-Pacific origin, which has Category II Status with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council. In 1987 it was established with the support of 
the UNESCAP, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United 
Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT). The City of Yokohama has 
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hosted the Secretariat of CITYNET to promote environmentally sustainable cities 
through: consultation services, training and workshops, joint research projects, 
information dissemination, and convening forums for members (Tjandradewi and 
Marcotullio 2009). As of 2009, the membership comprises 139 organisations (local 
authorities, municipal associations, NGOs, research institutions and private 
companies). While they may not apply to every city on the globe, the benefits of 
knowledge and governance for environmentally sustainable cities extend well beyond 
national boundaries. 
 
Analysis and conclusion 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a broad trend in environmental politics in Japan. 
This domestic political game was reverberated by the two oil crises yet the 
international events were largely exogenous from the viewpoint of domestic politics. 
The outputs from the events at the international level were used as the inputs to the 
domestic political game; this was a domestic adaptation to changes in the international 
environment. The oil crises as an exogenous variable for explaining the policy 
expansion are apolitical in the sense that these events caused unilaterally systemic 
effects on the policy formation regardless of the pro-business political orientation of 
the party in power. In essence, the environmental policy formation can be seen as a 
domestic-level process occurring within the Japanese state.  
 
The environmental policy expansion was a rather direct product of decisions made in 
the process of electoral politics. In this process, the LDP implemented its platforms to 
co-op the  opposition party’s environmental appeals and thus maintained power, and 
the national government effectively responded to heightened pressures from anti-
industrial pollution movements. The government party advanced environmental 
policies into an electorally attractive proposition. In the 1980s the LDP regained 
popularity and brought back the old bureaucratic-industrial dominant process to 
Japan’s environmental politics. Nakasone’s government single-mindedly pursued a 
technology-oriented policy for strengthening energy efficiency to reduce Japan’s 
external energy dependence. 
 
A shift of Japan’s environmental responses from industrial pollution to climate change 
created far more complex and uncertain constraints on decision-making. Japan’s 
diplomacy over climate change was shaped both by what other countries will accept 
and by what domestic constituencies will ratify and implement. In the process of the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, domestic constituencies’ demands were not exogenous 
in the sense that Japan’s delegation had to manipulate domestic politics for exploring 
a possibility of bargaining advantage over other countries. In the domestic political 
game of climate change, foreign pressures were not exogenous either in that the 
Japanese negotiators simultaneously employed foreign pressures to alter the scope of 
domestic constraints on the negotiations. Primarily due to the scientific technicality, 
and the uncertain adaptation costs of climate change, the domestic political game took 
place in the national bureaucracy. Domestic constraints derived from the bureaucracy-
led coalition building of sectoral interests. The course of Japanese delegation’s action 
leading up to the Kyoto Protocol reflected a simultaneous decision-making in both the 
domestic coalition building and the international negotiations. The coalition of 
diplomatic interests insisted a 6.5 percent reduction, using EU pressure (its proposed 
15 percent reduction) as one of their primary arguments against a zero percent 
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reduction proposed by the coalition of business interests. Internationally, Japan’s 
delegation was quite sensitive to U.S. wishes, due to its close relations with the United 
States. To ensure U.S. participation in the protocol, the Prime Minister’s Office 
intervened in the domestic political game, and settled Japan’s proposal with a 5 
percent reduction, which was to both internationally accepted by delegations from 
other countries and domestically ratified and implemented by the domestic 
constituencies. In the end, it placed Japan as the host nation in a leadership role with 
regard to the Kyoto Protocol; Japan needed to have ratified it while the United States 
refused to do so. 
 
At the early stage of COP-2, Japan expressed its opposition to any legally binding 
targets. Prior to the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, the Japanese government 
proposed a voluntary “pledge and review” approach, in a bid to bridge the differences 
between the EU and the United States who had consistently opposed legally binding 
fixed targets. How and why did Japan change its stance to adopt the Kyoto Protocol?  
The potential answers to this question reflect a theoretical link between the two levels 
of the domestic political game and the international negotiations. International 
pressure was employed by the Prime Minister’s Office to change the character of 
domestic constraints for opening up a new possibility that had not previously been 
available to Japan’s delegation for international accord. International pressure on the 
host nation had been building up in order to succeed in Kyoto and it became evident 
that the host nation was expected not to propose an approach that would drift apart 
from a possible international accord. The argument for Japan to go along with an 
internationally acceptable target thus gained much ground in the domestic political 
game. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Environmental Agency expressed 
their concern by saying: “We have been in contact with the countries concerned and 
in situations where failing to reach a 5 percent reduction among developed nations 
will be conceived of as a failure of the conference and may bring the host nation to 
account” (Takeuchi 1998, pp. 166-70, Tanabe 1999, pp. 125-26). They welcomed the 
international pressure on the Japanese government. Given the situation that set limits 
on its resistance, the MITI attempted to bring down Japan’s reduction rate as low as 
possible so that it could still manage the costs of business for emission reduction 
within the existing framework of energy efficiency policy. In the end, the Prime 
Minister’s Office successfully used international pressure for persuading the MITI to 
reduce its expectation with Japan’s proposed 5 percent.  
 
Citizens groups and local communities in the domestic political game were left out in 
the process leading to Japan’s proposal as the proposed 5 percent was determined on 
the run with little time to consult with other interested domestic constituencies. Local 
community groups began to direct their attention to local action that the global 
strategies of climate change would require. In this context, the increased visibility of 
Japanese local governments at the international level invites a closer examination.  
 
This study demonstrated four types of sub-national government participation, with a 
range of potential influence on international politics. First, a bilateral city-to-city 
partnership across borders has a potential for the exercise of locally-initiated 
international cooperation while persuading the home state to subsidise their projects 
and the reluctant state of partner’s to change its policy. This is one type of alternative 
to the two-level games (domestic/foreign divide) and may be regarded as a variation 
of “the boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Second, a sectoral network is the 
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place for the exchange of local knowledge in a specialised area of environmental 
issues, which could contribute to agenda-setting for international agreements. It 
controls the specialised, objective knowledge that negotiators require to reach the 
desired outcomes. This type of networks is known as “epistemic communities” (Hass 
1992). Third, a regional network highlights the value of decentralised cooperation in 
which local authorities take up a primary role and have become increasingly 
recognised as partners in regional affairs. The objective of a regional network is to use 
the network as mechanisms of equal, horizontal learning and knowledge exchange 
that benefits each other and/or to employ the network as instruments for local capacity 
building of the Southern members within the network. Fourth, a global network is 
likely to facilitate more systematic sub-national participation within international 
organisations (often with official consultative status) and induce more states’ 
responses to sub-national participation in the resolution of global social issues. It is 
presumed that network members work toward developing common understanding and 
pursuing wider public benefits beyond simple interest calculations (provision of 
international public goods). Perhaps its claim to political legitimacy by the global 
network that somehow represents the wider common good is a key source of influence. 
Finally it is important to note that local authorities in these different types of networks 
have taken part in international environmental regimes (consisting of principles, rules 
and regulations – more than 500 MEAs), which have been coordinated by 
international organisations, such as the UNEP, the UNDP, and the World Bank. These 
organisations, in particular, the UNEP, have facilitated the establishment and 
operation of the networks and extended expert advice on how sub-national 
participation can effectively engage in the national/regional preparation for, 
international negotiations on, multilateral environmental agreements and in the 




1. One major factor in the start of Japan’s attention to international environmental 
norms was the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in 
Stockholm in 1972. 
 
2. A large number of MEAs, while imposing direct legal obligations on member states, 
prescribed the necessary planning and operational actions at the sub-national level, for 
example, Article 3 of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 
Article 5 of the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, Article 4-2-(c) of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Article 4 of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
3. In this session of the Diet, fourteen pollution control bills were passed; nation-wide 
regulations instead of regulations only in designated areas were to be applied to air 
and water pollution, traffic pollution and noise, hazardous material transport, waste 
disposal and sewage, toxic waste, and Natural Parks. Equally important, the new 
antipollution laws held polluters financially responsible to their victims under civil 
law, and clarified the division of regulatory powers between national and sub-national 
governments.  All regulatory power over business operators was delegated to 
municipal governments. This regulatory mechanism, however, did not specify any 
nationally-defined mandatory emission standards.  It left regulation and enforcement 
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up to sub-national authorities. In the following year, the Environmental Agency, a 
successor to the Pollution Control Office, was established to coordinate the 
implementation of these new laws. See Broadbent (1998, pp. 123-24 and 2002, pp. 
312-14). 
 
4. Japan’s energy self-sufficiency ratio, if uranium is considered as an energy import, 
dropped from 14 per cent in 1970 to alarming 4 per cent in 2000 (IEA 2006). Japan 
has the lowest ratio among industrialised countries. 
 
5. In accordance with the law, a wide range of conservation measures were adopted. 
The most extensive one was the "Top Runner Program," which set up fuel efficiency 
standards for vehicles and energy efficiency standards for household appliances; 
required energy-intensive plants, major transportation businesses, and large office 
buildings to submit energy-conservation plans and reports; and provided incentives 
for integrated management of energy use at plants and offices. 
 
6. Calculated from OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, environmental and social 
statistics (OECD 2009, p. 117). In this source, primary energy supply per unit of GDP 
is based on tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per thousand 2000 US dollars of GDP 
calculated using PPPs. 
 
7. Kyoto Governor Ninagawa Torazo (1950-1978) and Tokyo Governor Minobe 
Ryokichi (1967-1979) retired in 1978 and 1979 respectively and Osaka Governor 
Kuroda Ryoichi (1971-1979) was voted out of office in 1979. 
 
8. These surveys were conducted by Public Relations Office in Prime Minister’s 
Office in 1971, 1973, 1975, 1979 and 1981. Respondents were asked about the 
pollution problem if they had personally experienced in the last five years. The 
number of environmental protest incidents dramatically dropped in 1974 and local 
protests remained sporadic throughout the 1980s. See Broadbent (1998, p. 288). 
 
9. Mani and Wheeler, while drawing on emissions per unit of output, designated as 
pollution-intensive industries five sectors: iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial 
chemicals, pulp and paper, and metallic mineral products. Using the same pollution-
intensity measure, they identified five non-pollution-intensive sectors: textiles, non-
electrical machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment, and instruments. 
 
10. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) was established in 1946 
voluntarily by industrial sectors of the world, with the aim of creating international 
standards for the purpose of promoting international exchange in the manufactured 
product and service sectors. 
 
11. Although the volume of environmental ODA increased, Japan’s accountability to 
the implementation of this new policy initiative was limited by certain factors, such as 
bureaucratic politics, yen-loan-dominated aid, and commercial strings attached to aid 
(or “tied aid”) (e.g., Potter 1994). 
 
12. If CO2/GDP is kg CO2/1000 US$ at 2000 prices, then Japan was the smallest 
polluter per unit of economic output in 2004. The ratio of Japan’s figure to other 
16 
major developed countries was 1.4 for Britain, 1.6 for Germany, 1.8 for France, 1.9 
for EU 27, 2.0 for United States, and 3.2 for Canada (JMETI 2007, p. 4). 
 
13. Keidanren was to resolve problems of the business community and make 
proposals to government officials. In May 2002, Keidanren merged with Nikkeiren 
(Japan federation of employers' associations) to form Nippon Keidanren (Japan 
Business Federation or JBF). The JBF membership of 1,609 is comprised of 1,295 
companies, 129 industrial associations, and 47 regional economic organisations (as of 
May 28, 2009).  
 
14. In April 2010, Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s cap and trade program started 
as the world’s first urban model of mandatory reduction of total emissions.  
 
15. It is important to note that the Japanese government had always accommodated its 
plan to the interest of the United States in the process of climate change treaty 
negotiations. When the United States stood alone in public opposition, Japan proposed 
a “pledge and review” system in which parties would unilaterally pledge specific 
actions and then an international body would review performance (Kameyama 2002). 
 
16. For the position of the foreign policy coalition and the process of Japan’s 
negotiations, see Tanabe Toshiaki (1999), Japan's chief negotiator and Ambassador 
for Global Environmental Affairs at COP-3. 
 
17. The ICLEI refers to Local Agenda 21 as a participatory, multi-sectoral process in 
which local participants voluntarily create long-term, strategic action plans and 
implement them to achieve sustainability in a way integrating environmental, social 
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